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CANADIAN FEDERALISM, THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE
SUPREME COURT: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEBATE ABOUT
CANADIAN FEDERALISM
PETER W. HOGG, Q.C. & WADE K. WRIGHT'
1. SCOPE OF THE PAPER
In preparation for our role in this conference, we revisited two articles about
Canadian federalism that were published by Ken Lysyk in 1979, when he was
Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of British Columbia. The first
article is entitled "Constitutional Reform and the Introductory Clause of
Section 91".' In that article, Lysyk argues that much of the controversy about
the introductory clause of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (originally
the British North America Act)2 is "attributable to failure to pay due regard to
the text of the [Act] itself" and "to a mis-reading of a number of important
decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."3 The second article
is entitled "Reshaping Canadian Federalism".4 In that article, Lysyk shares his
thoughts on what degree of centralization is appropriate in the Canadian
context, and suggests, for a number of reasons, that a highly centralized federal
system is inappropriate for Canada.
These articles have encouraged us to reflect on the academic debate about
Canadian federalism. As we reviewed the literature, we discovered that the
debate has been dominated, explicitly or implicitly, by disagreements over the
following four issues: First, did the framers of the Constitution Act, 1867
intend, for Canada, a highly centralized federal system or a loose confederacy
t Peter W. Hogg, Q.C. is Professor Emeritus at Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University and Scholar in Residence at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto. Wade K
Wright is an Associate at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto.
I K. Lysyk, "Constitutional Reform and the Introductory Clause of Section 91: Residual
and Emergency Law-Making Authority" (1979) 57 Can. Bar Rev. 531 [Lysyk, "Constitutional
Reform"].
2 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. I1, No. 5 (The name was
changed by the Constitution Act, 1982, Statutes of the U.K., 1982, c. 11) [Act].
3 Lysyk, "Constitutional Reform", supra note I at 534.
4 K. M. Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism" (1979) 13 U.B.C. L. Rev. I [Lysyk,
"Reshaping Canadian Federalism"].
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of largely independent provinces? Second, as drafted, does the Constitution
Act, 18675 indicate that it was intended to form the foundation for a highly
centralized or highly decentralized federal system? Third, was the Privy
Council biased in favour of the provinces in Canadian federalism cases, and, if
so, has Canada been served well or poorly by that provincial bias? And,
finally, has the Supreme Court of Canada expanded the scope of federal
powers and departed from the main lines of interpretation laid down by the
Privy Council, and, if so, has Canada been served well or poorly by those
expansions or departures? These four issues are the topic of this paper.
II. DID THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 INTEND,
FOR CANADA, A HIGHLY CENTRALIZED FEDERAL SYSTEM OR A
LOOSE CONFEDERACY OF LARGELY INDEPENDENT PROVINCES?
Academic writing about the original intentions of the framers of the
Constitution Act, 1867 can be divided, roughly, into two groups.6 The first
group, largely dominated by English-speaking academics from central Canada,
suggests that the framers of the Act intended Canada to be a highly centralized
federal system.7 The second group, largely dominated by French-speaking
academics from Quebec, suggests that the framers of the Constitution Act,
1867 intended Canada to be a loose confederacy of largely independent
provinces.'
5 Supra note 2.
6 Disagreements over the intentions of the framers are not confined to academic sources. In
Severn v. Ontario ((1878), 2 S.C.R. 70, 1 Cart. 414), one of the earliest federalism cases decided
by the newly formed Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court divided over the original
intent of the framers of the Constitution Act, 1867. Writing for the majority, Sir William Buell
Richards, the first Chief Justice of Canada, suggested in support of his majority judgment that
the framers intended to create a strong central government. Justice Strong, dissenting, reached
the opposite conclusion, and suggested, in support of his minority judgment, that "everything
indicates that co-equal and co-ordinate legislative powers in every particular were conferred by
the Act on the Provinces" (at 110). This debate continued in other early Supreme Court
federalism cases as well: see Ian Binnie, "Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent"
(2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 345 at 353-56 [Binnie, "Constitutional Interpretation"].
7 See e.g. Bora Laskin, "Peace, Order and Good Government Re-Examined" (1947) 25
Can. Bar Rev. 1054; Frank R. Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian
Federalism" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1095; Canada, O'Connor Report: Senate of Canada,
Parliamentary Counsel, Report Relating to the British North America Act, 1867 (Canada: 1939;
reprinted, 1961); and, most recently, John T. Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the
Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
8 See e.g. Louis-Phillipe Pigeon, "The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy" (1951) 29 Can.
Bar Rev. 1126; Jean Beetz "Les attitudes changeantes du Qubec A l'endroit de la Constitution
de 1867" in P.A. Crfpeau & C.B. Macpherson, eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) 113; Gouvernement du Qubec, (Rapport
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There are a number of explanations for these differences in opinion. The
first is that much will hinge, as Mr. Justice Ian Binnie recently noted, on whom
we regard as the framers of the Act.9 If, for example, only Sir John A.
Macdonald and the other English-Canadian federalists are regarded as the
framers, the conclusion that will inevitably follow is that the framers intended
Canada to be highly centralized.' ° On the other hand, if only the provincial
politicians from Quebec and the Maritimes are regarded as the framers, the
conclusion that will inevitably follow is that the framers intended Canada to be
highly decentralized.
The second explanation is that the historical record is weak, making it
difficult to determine, definitively, the intentions of any of the framers. There
are no verbatim records of the discussions at the confederation conferences
held at Charlottetown (1864), Quebec City (1864), and London, England
(1866). Further, of the three uniting provinces (the united province of Canada,
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), the legislative assemblies of two of those
provinces (Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) did not hold confederation
debates. The Parliament of the United Kingdom debated the bill that was
finally drafted in London, and that debate is recorded in Hansard. The result is
that we have an incomplete historical record, consisting of only: the text of the
72 Quebec City resolutions; the text of the 69 London resolutions; the
confederation debates in the legislative assembly of the united province of
Canada (1865); and the confederation debates in the Parliament of the United
Kingdom (1867). "
Not surprisingly, this led Alan Cairns to question whether " ... the pursuit
of the real meaning of the [Constitution Act, 1867] is ... a meaningless game,
incapable of a decisive outcome."' 2 Although there is some force to that claim,
in our view, there can be little doubt that the framers of the Act were divided,
Tremblay) Le Rapport de la Commission Royale d'enquete sur les problkmes constitutionnels,
quatre volumes (Quebec, 1956).
9 Binnie, "Constitutional Interpretation", supra note 6 at 375; see Act, supra note 2.
to This example is drawn from the judgment of Gwynne J. in the Prohibition Reference (In
re Prohibitory Liquor Laws (1895), 24 S.C.R. 170 at 206, 5 Cart. 303; rev'd [1896] A.C. 348,
11 C.R.A.C. 222 (P.C.) [Prohibition Reference]), where Sir John A. MacDonald was cited to
support the argument that the framers wanted to avoid the decentralizing force of the states'
rights doctrine in the United States.
I The most comprehensive collection of confederation documents is in Gerald P. Browne,
Documents on the Confederation of British North America (Toronto: McClelland, 1969). Janet
Ajzenstat, ed., Canada's Founding Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) is an
edited collection of the debates in the colonial legislative assemblies.
12 Alan C. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and its Critics" (1971) 4 Canadian Journal of
Political Science 301 at 334-35.
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some intending Canada to be highly centralized, and others intending Canada
to be a loose confederacy of largely independent provinces.
13
The view that the framers were sharply divided on the appropriate degree
of centralization or decentralization is more realistic than the competing
theories that attribute an exclusively centralist or decentralist impulse to the
framers. It accords with the historical context in which the Constitution Act,
1867 4 was drafted-the framers of the Act were required to accommodate two
conflicting desiderata. On the one hand, English-Canadian politicians from
central Canada, admiring the highly centralized form of government in the
United Kingdom, and knowing that the principle of representation by
population would give them control over the new Parliament of Canada,
preferred a strong central government. This centralizing impulse was
reinforced by the aftermath of the American Civil War, one cause of which
was widely held to be the granting of excessive powers to the states by the
United States Constitution. On the other hand, French-Canadian politicians
were acutely aware that they would be a minority in the new Parliament of
Canada, but also that they would control the Legislature of the new province of
Quebec. Thus, they insisted that the provincial Legislature be vested with
enough power to safeguard the French language and culture, the civil law, and
the Roman Catholic religion of Quebec. Similarly fearful for their local
traditions and institutions, and protective of their independence, the politicians
from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island also insisted that
their legislatures be vested with enough power to regulate the daily life of the
people, as they had been doing before confederation.
Considered against this historical backdrop, it is hardly surprising that those
favouring a centralist interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1867 and those
favouring a decentralist interpretation of the Act have been able to locate
evidence to support their respective positions. G. P. de T. Glazebrook's
suggestion that " ... particular interpretations and points of view were
rationalized by tailored versions of the constitution"'15 seems apposite. But, like
Lysyk, we believe that these exclusively centralist or decentralist
interpretations of the framers' intentions fail to acknowledge that " ... the
13 This view is shared by Peter Russell: see "Book Review of The Judicial Committee and
the British North America Act", Book Review of The Judicial Committee and the British North
America Act by G.P. Brown, (March 1968) XLIX: I Canadian Historical Review, 66-67;
"Introduction" in Peter Russell, Rainer Knopff, & Ted Morton, eds., Federalism and the
Charter: Leading Constitutional Decisions, 3d ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982);
and "Comment on 'Critics of the Judicial Committee: The New Orthodoxy and an Alternative
Explanation"' (1986) 19 Canadian Journal of Political Science 53 1.
14 Supra note 2.
15 George P. de Twenebroker Glazebrook, A History of Canadian Political Thought
(Toronto: McClelland, 1966) at 264.
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architects of our Constitution were far from unanimous in their stated
objectives ... 16
III. AS DRAFTED, DOES THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 INDICATE
THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO FORM THE FOUNDATION FOR A
HIGHLY CENTRALIZED OR HIGHLY DECENTRALIZED FEDERAL
SYSTEM?
As drafted, the Constitution Act, 186717 contains a number of features that
indicate that it was intended to form the foundation for a highly centralized
federal system. The first indication is that the Act subordinated the provinces
to the federal government or the federal Parliament, in the following five
respects: First, by section 90, the federal government was given the power to
disallow (invalidate) provincial statutes. Second, by section 58, the federal
government was given the power to appoint the Lieutenant Governor of each
province (and, by section 92(1), the provinces were denied the power to alter
that part of their constitutions). Third, by section 96, the federal government
was given the power to appoint the judges of the superior, district and county
courts of each province. Fourth, by section 93, the federal government was
given the power to determine appeals from provincial decisions affecting
minority education rights, and the federal Parliament was given the power to
enforce a decision on appeal by the enactment of "remedial laws". Fifth, by
sections 91(29) and 92(10)(c), the federal Parliament was given the unilateral
power to bring local works within exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction by
declaring them to be "for the general advantage of Canada".
The second indication that the Constitution Act, 1867 was intended to form
the foundation for a highly centralized federal system is that the distribution of
powers in the Act is, in the following three respects, more centralized than the
distribution of powers in the United States' Constitution-the only useful 8
federal precedent available to the framers in 1867. First, in Canada, the federal
Parliament was given the power to regulate "trade and commerce" without
qualification, while in the United States, Congress was given the more limited
power to regulate "commerce with foreign nations and among the several
16 Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 3.
17 Supra note 2.
18 Anthony H. Birch, Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation (London: Oxford, 1955)
at xiv (The constitution of Switzerland was the only other federal constitution in existence in
1867, but the small geographic size, and different social and political environment of
Switzerland made it a dubious precedent in comparison with the United States).
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states and with the Indian tribes". 9 Second, in Canada, the list of specified
federal heads of power included several topics left to the states in the United
States' Constitution, including banking (section 91(15)), marriage and divorce
(section 91(26)), the criminal law (section 91(27)), and penitentiaries (section
91(28)). Third, in Canada, the provincial Legislatures were given only
enumerated powers to make laws, leaving the residue of power with the
federal Parliament, 20 while in the United States, residuary power had been left
with the states.2 '
The final indication that the Constitution Act, 186722 was intended to form
the foundation for a highly centralized federal system is that the distribution of
power was structured to make the federal government fiscally dominant. By
section 91(3), the federal government was given the power to levy indirect as
well as direct taxes while, by section 92(2), the provinces were given only the
authority to levy direct taxes. In 1867, the inability to levy indirect taxes
placed serious fiscal restraints on the provinces, because at that time the
indirect taxes of the customs and excise accounted for 80 percent of the
revenues of the uniting colonies. The framers anticipated the shortfall between
provincial revenues and provincial responsibilities, and the Act provided for
federal grants to the provinces.
For a litany of commentators, these features of the Constitution Act, 1867
provide incontrovertible proof that the Act was intended to form the foundation
for a highly centralized federal system.23 There are, however, at least two
major features of the Act that provide support for the opposite view, namely,
that the Act was intended to form the foundation for a less centralized federal
system.
The first such feature is the power, assigned to the provincial Legislatures
by section 92(13), to make laws concerning "property and civil rights in the
province." Prior to confederation, the phrase "property and civil rights"
provided a compendious description of the entire body of private law that
governs the relationship between subject and subject, including much of the
19 U. S. Const., art. 1, § 8(3) (Ironically, the qualified language of the U.S. "commerce
clause" has been given almost unlimited scope by the courts, while the unqualified language of
the Canadian "trade and commerce" power has been severely restricted by the courts).
20 There is uncertainty about this point, for reasons that are discussed below.
21 The residual legislative authority is also, for example, assigned to the constituent units of
the federation in the constitutions of Australia, Switzerland, and Germany.
22 Supra note 2.
23 See supra note 7.
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law relating to property, the family, contracts and torts.24 For some, including
Lysyk, assignment of legislative authority over that broad class of subjects to
the provinces is indicative of the intention to draft a document that, at the very
least, granted extensive legislative powers to the provinces.25
To be sure, the historical definition of property and civil rights underwent
some changes in its new context in section 92(13). The enumerated list of
federal heads of legislative power in section 91 included a number of matters
which would otherwise have come within property and civil rights in the
province, for example, trade and commerce (section 91(2)), banking (section
91(15)), bills of exchange and promissory notes (section 91(18)), interest
(section 19(19)), bankruptcy and insolvency (section 91(12)), patents of
invention and discovery (section 91(22)), copyrights (section 91(23)), and
marriage and divorce (section 91(28)). By vesting these matters in the federal
Parliament exclusively, the Act 26 withdrew them from the rubric of property
and civil rights. In addition, the opening language of section 91 (described
below) presumably contemplated that certain matters that would have come
within property and civil rights could attain such a national dimension as to
come within federal competence.27 But, even after making all required
subtractions, the phrase "property and civil rights in the province" was still apt
to cover most of the legal relationships between persons, leaving much of the
law relating to property, the family, contracts and torts.
The second feature of the Constitution Act, 1867 that arguably points in the
direction of a less centralized federal system is the allocation of the residuary
legislative power. The drafting of the residuary power is a triumph of
ambiguity and uncertainty, and has remained a central concern of the courts
since confederation.
According to the conventional reading of the Act, the residuary power was
conferred exclusively on the federal Parliament by the introductory words of
section 91. These words confer on Parliament the power "to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not
coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the provinces." According to this reading, of course, the
assignment of the residuary power indicates a centralized model of federalism.
24 Quebec Act, 1774 (U.K.), 14 George III, c. 83, s. 8 (restoring French civil law to
conquered colony of Quebec); Property and Civil Rights Act, 1792, R.S.U.C. 1792, s. 1
(restoring English law to the province of Upper Canada (now Ontario)).
25 Lysyk, "Constitutional Reform", supra note I at 543-45.
26 Supra note 2.
27 The zoning of the national capital region has since been held to be an example of this
kind of federal subject matter: Munro v. National Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57
D.L.R. (2d) 753 [Munro].
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However, according to another (less conventional) reading of the
Constitution Act, 1867,28 it contains, not one residuary power, but two
complementary grants of power that distribute the residue between the federal
Parliament and the provincial Legislatures. Albert S. Abel advanced one
version of this shared residuary power: In Abel's view, the federal residuary
power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada is
complemented by a provincial residuary power in section 92(16), which
confers on the provincial Legislatures the power to make laws concerning
"generally all matters of a merely local or private nature". 29 He argues that
legislative competence to deal with a particular issue not covered by the
enumerated heads of power in sections 91 and 92 would depend on whether
the unassigned matter of legislation is in relation to "the peace, order, and
good government of Canada" (federal) or "matters of a merely local or private
nature" (provincial).
Lysyk advanced a slightly different version of the shared interpretation of
the residuary power.30 Lysyk agreed with Abel that the provincial Legislatures
are granted a residuary power, by section 92(16), to make laws concerning
"generally all matters of a merely local or private nature", and that the federal
Parliament is granted a complementary residuary power by the introductory
words of section 91. Unlike Abel, Lysyk insisted that the federal Parliament's
residuary power was contained, not in the words conferring the power "to
make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada", but in the
words conferring the power " ... to make laws ... in relation to all matters not
coming within the class of subjects ... assigned exclusively to the Legislatures
of the Provinces." Thus, for Lysyk, legislative competence to deal with a
particular issue not covered by the enumerated heads of power would depend
entirely on whether the unassigned matter of legislation is in relation to
28 Supra note 2.
29 Albert S. Abel, "What Peace, Order and Good Government?" (1968) 7 U.W.O. L. Rev.
I. See also Prohibition Reference, supra note 10, Lord Watson.
30 Lysyk, "Constitutional Reform", supra note 1 at 535-43 (In support of this claim that the
Constitution Act, 1867 contains two complementary residuary powers, Lysyk traces the
evolution of the residuary power back to the Resolutions adopted at the Quebec City Conference
(1864) and the London Conference (1866). In both Resolutions, the residuary power conferred
on the provincial Legislatures (namely, the power to make laws concerning "matters of a private
of local nature") and the residuary power conferred on the federal Parliament (namely, the
power to make laws concerning "matters of a general character") were located at the end of the
enumerated heads of power. The Constitution Act, 1867 departed from this strictly parallel
structure, by placing the residuary power conferred on the federal Parliament in the introductory
words of section 91. Although Lysyk concedes this drafting change obscured the original intent
(shared residuary powers), he still insists that the original Quebec City and London Resolutions
make it clear that the drafters intended to provide for complementary federal and provincial
residuary powers.).
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"matters of a merely local or private nature". Accordingly, if the matter is "of a
merely local or private nature", it is within the power of the provincial
Legislatures; if, however, the matter is not "of a merely local or private
nature," the matter is within the power of the federal Parliament.
In our view, Lysyk's reading is the more plausible of the two. First, in his
article, Abel insisted that the phrase "peace, order and good government of
Canada" should not be treated as "a jingle",3 ' but should be dissected so that a
court asks of a statute: "does this involve the peace of Canada? the order of
Canada? the good government of Canada?' 32 However, as Abel himself
conceded, his suggestion finds no support in the case law.
In addition, Abel's suggestion finds no support in the text of the
Constitution Act, 186733 itself. As Lysyk notes, the introductory clause of
section 91 " ... confers authority to legislate for the peace, order and good
government of Canada, but only in relation to matters not coming within
provincial classes of subjects. 34 This is significant, he argues, because the
words "in relation to" are power-conferring words that are consistently used to
identify " ... the matters or subjects or classes of subjects which are being
allotted."35
Finally, and most importantly, Abel's suggestion seems to be historically
inaccurate. The phrase "peace, order and good government", or some variant
thereof, is found in nearly all of the British-derived constitutions, and has
consistently been interpreted as "a compendious means of delegating full
powers of legislation", subject to any limitations which may be derived from
other language of the constitution.3 6 It is, we think, consistent with this
understanding that the relevant question, when called upon to determine
legislative competence to deal with an issue not covered by the enumerated
heads of power, is whether the matter is "of a merely local or private nature",
failing which it falls within federal jurisdiction (Lysyk), not whether the matter
involves the peace of Canada, the order of Canada, or the good government of
Canada (Abel).37
31 Abel, supra note 29 at 4.
32 Ibid. at 6.
33 Supra note 2.
34 Lysyk, "Constitutional Reform", supra note 1 at 541.
35 Ibid. at 541-42.
36 Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1957) at 49; Ibralebbe v. The Queen, [1964] A.C. 900 at 923 (P.C.).
37 Interestingly, this is, by inference, basically the same test used to determine whether a
matter falls within the "national concern" branch of the peace, order and good government
power. This test, which was formulated by Viscount Simon in the Canada Temperance case A.-
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Of course, a good deal of water has flowed under the bridge since 1867,
and these debates do not have much present practical significance. In practice,
the provincial "residuary power" in section 92(16) has turned out to be
relatively unimportant, because the wide scope of the "property and civil
rights" power in section 92(13) has left little in the way of a residue of "merely
local or private" matters. Indeed, at the hands of the Privy Council, the
"property and civil rights" power became a kind of residuary power in its own
right. Furthermore, a cluster of doctrine has now become embedded on the
federal residuary power, authorizing laws to fill gaps, laws to deal with
national emergencies, and laws to deal with matters of "national concern". But
these outcomes are not inconsistent with the basic scheme elaborated by
Lysyk-and of course he was well aware of the post-1867 developments. For
our purposes, the important point is this: there is a plausible argument that the
Constitution Act, 186738 includes not one, but two complementary residuary
powers. This argument, in turn, strengthens the view that the Act, as drafted,
was intended to form the foundation for a federal system that is less
centralized than many English-Canadian commentators have supposed.
Our conclusion is that the Constitution Act, 1867 includes conflicting
signals as to the degree of centralization or decentralization stipulated by the
federal scheme that the Act established. In our view, the framers deliberately
tolerated these conflicting signals in the Act because they needed to
accommodate conflicting goals-the desire for a strong central government
(English-Canada) and the desire to protect local languages, cultures, and
institutions (French-Canada and the Maritimes). The text is ambiguous,
probably intentionally so.
The framers of the Constitution needed these conflicting signals in order to
ensure approval of their handiwork by the British North American colonists,
who were divided by language, religion, tradition, and location. In fact, the
ambiguities helped the scheme to win immediate approval in both Canada
West (Ontario) and Canada East (Quebec) and in two of the Maritime
provinces (Nova Scotia and New Brunswick). Moreover, over the years the
Act, without significant amendment, has proved capable of accommodating-
in a federal union of ten provinces and three territories-most of the northern
part of North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. This expansion
was one of the original goals of the Act, which made provision for other
colonies to adhere to the scheme (and for territories to be created into
G. Ont. v. Canada Temperance Foundation, [1946] A.C. 193, [1946] 2 D.L.R. I (P.C.) [Canada
Temperance cited to A.C.], asks at 205-06 whether the matter of the legislation "goes beyond
local or provincial concern or interests and must from its inherent nature be the concern of the
Dominion as a whole" [emphasis added]. See also Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 17.3.
38 Supra note 2.
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provinces), and for railways to run across the continent. The difficulties of
interpretation and finding a degree of centralization acceptable to all were left
to be settled later, either by political practice (as in the case of the federal-
provincial financial arrangements) or by the decisions of the courts (which at
the time meant the Privy Council, which remained the final court of appeal for
Canada until 1949).
IV. WAS THE PRIVY COUNCIL BIASED IN FAVOUR OF THE
PROVINCES IN CANADIAN FEDERALISM CASES, AND IF SO, HAS
CANADA BEEN SERVED WELL OR SERVED POORLY BY THAT
PROVINCIAL BIAS?
There is no doubt that the Privy Council favoured the provinces in federalism
cases. In the disputes between the federal and provincial governments that
reached the courts, the Privy Council consistently established doctrine that
favoured the provinces. In two early decisions, the Council established that the
federal and provincial governments were not in a relationship of superior to
inferior, which, as noted above, was implied by some of the provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1867.39 Rather, their lordships held, the provinces were of
coordinate status with the federal government.
40
Further favouring the provinces, the Privy Council gave a very narrow
interpretation to the federal power to make laws for "the peace, order, and
good government of Canada" (the "p.o.g.g." power). 4' The p.o.g.g. power was
used by the Privy Council to sustain two types of federal legislation:
legislation that filled a particular gap in the distribution of powers (the "gap
branch"); and temporary legislation that responded to an emergency (the
"emergency branch").4 2 To restrict a federal residuary power to these two
branches was in itself an extraordinary narrowing of the power, but the two
branches were also narrowed by the Privy Council. With respect to the "gap
39 Supra note 2.
40 Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 (P.C.) (provincial legislative powers as
plenary and ample as imperial Parliament); Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v. Receiver
General of N.B., [1892] A.C. 437, 10 C.R.A.C. 180 (P.C.) (provincial executive powers match
legislative powers).
41 See also Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 37 at ch. 17.
42 See further Hogg, ibid. (From 1911 to 1928, when Lord Haldane sat on the Privy
Council, the Council consistently applied the view that only an emergency would serve to
enable the federal Parliament to exercise its p.o.g.g. power. However, prior to 1911, the Privy
Council did sustain one piece of federal legislation on the basis that the matter fell within the
gap branch of the p.o.g.g power. In addition, prior to 1911 and after 1928, the Privy Council
suggested, in obiter, that matters of concern to the nation as a whole might also trigger the
application of the p.o.g.g. power).
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branch", the Privy Council found only one gap in the distribution of powers-
the incorporation of companies with other than provincial objects.43 In
contrast, new kinds of economic and social regulation were, typically,
regarded as laws in relation to property and civil rights in the province and
were assigned to the provinces under section 92(13).
With respect to the "emergency branch", absent evidence of "a sudden
danger to social order '44 or "extraordinary peril to the national life of
Canada",45 the Privy Council was slow to recognize the existence of an
emergency. The First and Second World Wars did count as emergencies,
enabling extensive federal wartime regulation that would have been outside
federal authority in peacetime. 46 But the Privy Council held that the Great
Depression of 1929 did not count as an emergency, and as a result, their
lordships struck down the federal Parliament's "Canadian New Deal"
legislation (unemployment insurance, competition laws, minimum wages,
natural products marketing scheme).47
The Privy Council also gave a very narrow interpretation to the federal
power to make laws relating to "trade and commerce" (section 91(2)), and a
43 Citizens' Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) [Citizens' Insurance].
In the Radio Reference case (Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Can.,
[1932] A.C. 304, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 81 (P.C.)), the Privy Council held at 312 that the power to
perform Canadian (as opposed to imperial) treaties also came within the "gap branch" of the
p.o.g.g. power, because it was "not mentioned explicitly in either s. 91 or s. 92." Even though
this appeared to be a faithful reading of the Constitution Act, 1867, it was later emphatically
rejected by a differently-constituted Privy Council, speaking through Lord Atkin, in the Labour
Conventions case (A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326, [1937] 1
D.L.R. 673 (P.C.) [Labour Conventions case]). Thus, incorporation of companies remains the
only gap that the Privy Council ever found in the distribution of powers.
44 Fort Frances Pulp & Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co., [1923] A.C. 695 at 703-04,
[1923] 3 D.L.R. 629 (P.C.), Lord Haldane [Fort Frances cited to A.C.].
45 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 at 412, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5
(P.C.), Lord Haldane [Toronto Electric cited to A.C.].
46 See e.g., Fort Frances, supra note 44 (price of newsprint controlled by federal law
during First World War); and Coop Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A.G. Can., [1947]
A.C. 87, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 (P.C.) (deportation of Japanese Canadians during Second World
War).
47 Re Unemployment Insurance Reference, [1937] A.C. 355, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684 (P.C.)
(striking down federal unemployment insurance scheme). The other "new deal cases" in the
Privy Council are: the Labour Conventions Case, supra note 43; A.-.G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can. (Price
Spreads), [1937] A.C. 368, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 688 (P.C.) [Price Spreads]; A.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can.
(Natural Products Marketing), [1937] A.C. 377, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 691 (P.C.) [Natural Products
Marketing]; A.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can. (Farmers' Creditors Arrangement), [1937] A.C. 391,
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 695 (P.C.) [Farmers' Creditors Arrangement]; A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can.
(Canada Standard Trade Mark), [1937] A.C. 405, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 702 (P.C.) [Canada
Standard Trade Mark].
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correspondingly expansive interpretation to the provincial power to make laws
relating to "property and civil rights in the province" (section 92(13)).48 In
particular, the Privy Council read down the federal trade and commerce power,
holding that it did not include "the power to regulate by legislation the
contracts of a particular business or trade ' 49 or the "particular trades in which
Canadians would [otherwise] be free to engage in the Provinces".5 ° A pattern
was thus set whereby the regulation of business5 and labour relations5 2 (with
the exception of certain industries specifically allocated to Parliament) 3 fell
within the provincial property and civil rights power, and the federal trade and
commerce power was generally restricted to international and interprovincial
trade and commerce. The Privy Council did say that the federal trade and
commerce power could extend to "general regulation of trade affecting the
whole dominion",54 but the only example of this potentially expansive
category was a law establishing a national trademark.
5
There now seems to be little doubt that these developments stemmed, in
part, from a pro-provincial bias.56 Lord Watson and Lord Haldane, who
dominated Canadian appeals to the Privy Council from 1880 to 1899 (Watson)
and 1911 to 1928 (Haldane), shared a preconceived notion about the proper
form of a federal system, a notion that placed much emphasis on the protection
and enhancement of the position of the provinces.5 This idea, as much as the
48 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 37 at ch. 20 and 21.
49 Citizens' Insurance, supra note 43 at 113.
50 Reference Re Board of Commerce Act (Canada), 1919 & Combines and Fair Prices Act,
[1922] 1 A.C. 191 at 198, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 20 (P.C.).
51 Citizens' Insurance, supra note 43 (upholding provincial regulation of insurance
industry).
52 Toronto Electric Commissioners, supra note 45 (striking down federal regulation of
labour relations).
53 The important exclusions from provincial power were 'navigation and shipping' (section
91(10)), 'banking' (section 91(15)), and 'interprovincial transportation and communication'
(section 91(29), read with section 92(10(a)).
54 Citizens' Insurance, supra note 43 at 113.
55 Canada Standard Trade Mark, supra note 47.
56 For discussions of the provincial bias of the Privy Council, see Cairns, supra note 12 at
312, n. 50.
57 See, for example, Lord Haldane, "The Work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council" (1923) 1 Cambridge L.J. 143 at 150 (the following passage was drawn from
a speech that Lord Haldane delivered to the Cambridge University Law Society in 1923):
At one time, after the [Constitution Act, 1867] was passed, the conception
took hold of the Canadian Courts that what was intended was to make the
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(admittedly unclear) constitutional text, seems to have been the driving force
behind decisions, discussed above, that elevated the provinces to coordinate
status with the federal government, led to narrow interpretations of the
principal federal powers, and that gave a wide interpretation to the principal
provincial power over property and civil rights.
The decisions of Lord Watson and Lord Haldane (in particular) and the
Privy Council (in general)-the 'wicked stepfathers of confederation', as they
were wittily described-were much criticized in English Canada 8 (although
not in French Canada)59 for their provincial bias. In retrospect, we believe, like
Lysyk60 and several others,6' that these criticisms were unduly harsh, and that
Canada was, on the whole, not badly served by the Privy Council. We have
reached this conclusion for a number of reasons.
First, the text of the Constitution Act, 186762 is not as clear as the critics
claimed. As we noted above, the framers attempted to accommodate the
conflicting goals of the English-Canadian politicians of Upper Canada
(Canada West) on the one hand, and the French-Canadian and Maritime
politicians on the other hand by incorporating features (centralizing features
for the former, decentralizing features for the latter) that were attractive to both
Dominion the centre of the government in Canada, so that its statutes and
position should be superior to the statutes and position of the Provincial
Legislatures. That went so far that there arose a great fight; and as the result
of a long series of decisions Lord Watson put clothing upon the bones of the
Constitution, and so covered them over with living flesh that the
Constitution of Canada took new form. The Provinces were recognized as of
equal authority co-ordinate with the Dominion, and a long series of
decisions were given by him which solved many problems and produced a
new contentment in Canada with the Constitution they had got in 1867.
See also A.G. Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [1914] A.C. 237 at 252 (P.C.)
(Lord Haldane expounds on the nature of federalism in general and in Canada in particular).
58 See the sources identified in supra note 7.
59 See the sources identified in supra note 8.
60 See Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 5 (Lysyk wrote as
follows: "I believe it must be acknowledged that, on the whole, the Privy Council did a
creditable job of interpreting our Constitution in a way which preserved a balance in the
Canadian federation.").
61 See, in particular, Cairns, supra note 12 at 301. See also G.P. Browne, The Judicial
Committee and the British North America Act (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967);
W.R. Lederman, "Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism", (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev. 597;
Frederick Vaughan, "Critics of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council", (1986) 19
Canadian Journal of Political Science 495. But see Saywell, supra note 7, who takes an
unrepentantly critical approach, and emphasizes their formalism, their ignorance of Canada, and
their failure to understand the scheme that was established in 1867.
62 Supra note 2.
VOL. 38:2
THE DEBATE ABOUT CANADIAN FEDERALISM
groups. And so, while the Privy Council did favour the provinces-for reasons
that may have had very little to do with the text of the Act 6 3 itself-the text did
not point uniformly in the direction of centralization.
Second, it is at least worth mentioning that the critics of the Privy Council
assumed that considerations of economic and social policy all called for a
highly centralized federation. They were influenced by the Great Depression
of 1929 and the Second World War of 1939-45, both of which certainly
required a powerful central government. Sixty years after these protracted but
extraordinary crises, we can, we think, acknowledge that considerations of
economic and social policy do not all point in one direction. There are virtues
to decentralization as well. One virtue is the idea of the social laboratory. As
Brandeis J. famously commented, it is a happy incident of a federal system
that the states (or provinces) can act as a "social laboratory" in which new
kinds of legislative programs can be "tested". 64 If a new program is not
successful, the nation as a whole has not been placed at risk; but, if the
program does work out, it may be copied by the other provinces or states, and
perhaps (if the Constitution permits) by the federal government. We have seen
this benign process at work in Canada, as provinces experimented with social
credit (which started in Alberta in 1935, and never took hold), Medicare
(which started in Saskatchewan in 1961 and became a national program in
1968), family property regimes (which have now been adopted by all
provinces), and no-fault automobile insurance (which now exists in several
provinces). Lysyk certainly accepted the force of this point, emphasizing the
value of experimentation and innovation at the provincial level, and worrying
that worthwhile legislative initiatives may not be realized when the federal
government controls the provinces too closely.65
Another idea that has gained adherents, especially in Western Europe
(where nations struggle to accommodate a European Community), is
"subsidiarity". Subsidiarity is the principle that decision-making should be
kept as close to the individuals affected as possible.66 In the Canadian context,
this expresses a bias in favour of action at the provincial, rather than the
federal level, because the provincial government is closer to the people and
63 Supra note 2.
64 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262 at 311, Brandeis J. (1932) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.")
65 Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 8.
66 See Peter W. Hogg, "Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada" (1993) 3
N.J.C.L. 341; see also the other articles in the symposium on subsidiarity of which that article is
one contribution: (1993) 3 N.J.C.L. 301-427.
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more attuned to their circumstances and preferences. The word "subsidiarity"
had not gained currency when Lysyk wrote his pieces on federalism, but he
would have liked the idea. There are important governmental functions that are
best performed at the central level (the regulation of competition and
securities" are arguably two examples). But the principle of subsidiarity
suggests that functions that can be performed at the provincial level should be
handled at the provincial level-as close to the individuals affected as
possible.
Third, there are, we believe, compelling practical reasons to prefer a
decentralized federal system in the Canadian context. Critics of Canadian
decentralization have often contrasted Canada (which is comparatively
decentralized) with the United States and Australia (which are comparatively
centralized).68 We agree with Lysyk's suggestion (made with respect to the
United States) that " ... a high degree of centralism might be suitable for a
unilingual country which has seen itself as a 'melting pot.' ' 69 But, we doubt,
like Lysyk, that a high degree of centralism is equally appropriate for Canada,
" ... a country with two official languages, two distinct legal systems, and a
small multicultural population thinly distributed over a huge land mass."7 °
Finally, and most important of all, the decentralizing bias that is evident in
the Privy Council's decisions was, we think, consistent with other forces that
were at play in Canada, forces that predetermined that Canada was going to be
more decentralized than either the United States or Australia. The first such
force is Quebec. In Canada, the majority of French Canadians live in Quebec,
and their desire to protect their language and culture has taken the form of an
insistence on provincial rights-a demand that Quebeckers be masters in their
own house. In contrast, in the United States and Australia, minority groups (for
example, African Americans in the United States and the Aboriginal peoples
of Australia) are dispersed across the country. Minority groups that are
dispersed in this fashion are typically unsympathetic to the rights of states or
provinces, and usually look to the institutions of the federal government for
redress of their grievances, both in the form of legislation and judicial
67 The case for federal power is argued by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada,
Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, vol. 3, by P. Anisman & Peter W. Hogg
(Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979) at 135.
68 On Australian and Canadian federalism, see Christopher D. Gilbert, Australian and
Canadian Federalism (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986). On United States and
Canadian federalism, see Alexander Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United
States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1963).
69 Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 5.
70 Ibid.
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decisions. Accordingly, they reinforce the economic and social forces that tend
to favour the growth of central power.
The economic and social forces that in all modem economies are increasing
the power of national governments in relation to regional governments are
present in Canada as well, of course, but they meet continuous resistance from
Quebec. And Quebec cannot be ignored. It has nearly 25 per cent of Canada's
population (7.5 million of 32 million) and when it does not elect a separatist
government it elects a government with strong 'nationalist' (meaning
provincialist) ambitions.7' These governments, aided and abetted by the
French-language media, keep the federal government highly sensitive to
Quebec's concerns. In all federations, there is a high volume of rhetoric about
states' rights (or similar such ideas), but in Canada these ideas are not just
rhetoric. The threat of Quebec's secession gives the provinces more leverage
in federal-provincial relations than is possessed by the states in the United
States or Australia. And, of course, within Canada, Quebec's concerns are
taken more seriously than the concerns of the other provinces, because the
other provinces (notwithstanding occasional radical manifestations of "western
alienation") are here to stay. Canadians outside of Quebec often complain that
Quebec makes too many demands, but virtually all would regard the secession
of Quebec as a tragedy. No one wants a large hole in the middle of the country,
dividing the Maritimes from Ontario and the west. And, perhaps even more
important, Canadian identity is associated with an image of the country as one
that includes a unique, French-speaking province. For these reasons, no serious
politician outside Quebec ever expresses indifference to (let alone support for)
"breaking up the country".
The principal members of the Privy Council never visited Canada and some
of the Privy Council's decisions include errors that show that their lordships
were ill-informed about the country. Yet, the Privy Council somehow
managed to perceive some part of the federal-provincial forces at work in
Canada. And so, while it appears to make little sense, in a highly integrated
economy, to regulate labour relations and business primarily at the provincial
level, the reality is that in a country like Canada, efficiency is far from the only
value that must be taken into account. In "Reshaping Canadian Federalism",
Lysyk asked whether " ... the jurisprudence passed on to us by the Privy
Council, so roundly condemned as ignorant or perverse, may in fact have
reflected an appreciation that an attempt to impose complete domination from
71 If there is an exception, it is the current Liberal government of Premier Charest, which
was elected in 2003 following two terms of Parti Qu6b6cois government (which included a 1995
referendum on separation). The new government obviously believes there should be some
respite from the divisive politics of the previous government, but it is safe to speculate that the
new government will not behave much differently from its predecessors when issues arise that
are seen as important to Quebec's autonomy.
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the centre would have imposed strains on the Canadian federation which, quite
simply, would have proved unacceptable".72 It may be a stretch to suggest that
the law lords actually had such an appreciation, but we do believe that Pierre
Trudeau was correct when he said, " ... if the law lords had not leaned [in the
direction of the provinces], Quebec separatism might not be a threat today: it
might be an accomplished fact. 73
Although the existence of Quebec is enough to explain why Canada cannot
be as highly centralized as the United States or Australia, there are other
Canadian circumstances that have also contributed to this result.74 For
example, since 1867, social services and education, both areas of provincial
jurisdiction, have increased enormously in significance, with the result that
a great deal of 'the action', the real action, has turned out to be at the
provincial level. 75 Since 1867, many of the centralizing features of the
Constitution Act, 186776 (for example, the powers of reservation and
disallowance) have fallen into disuse, " ... not because their meaning was
distorted by the courts, but because they were incompatible with developments
in the country as a whole.,
77
As well, the Canadian provinces, or small groups of them, correspond to
different economic regions of the country, so that the provinces have become
the natural advocates of regional interests-more so than in the United States
and Australia. Moreover, provincial control of natural resources has given the
resource-rich provinces important sources of wealth and power. In addition,
new provinces have entered the union since 1867,78 and those new provinces
have fostered (some more than others) a strong provincial identity.
Finally, every federal policy initiative is automatically contested, in the
political realm and, if necessary, in the courts, by provincial leaders not only in
Quebec, but in the other provinces as well. This becomes a disincentive to
federal initiatives, since any new federal programme leads to a fierce political
battle with the provinces (on top of whatever other political opposition may
exist). Recent examples are the (unsuccessful) provincial court challenges to
72 Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 5.
73 Pierre E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: MacMillan, 1968) at
198.
74 For a fuller account of these forces, see Cairns, supra note 12 at 319-27; Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 37 at 6.9.
75 Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 6.
76 Supra note 2.
77 Cairns, supra note 12 at 322.
78 Alberta (1905), British Columbia (1871), Manitoba (1870), and Saskatchewan (1905) in
the west, and Prince Edward Island (1873) and Newfoundland (1949) in the east.
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the Goods and Services Tax,79 the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 8°
and the Firearms Act (gun control). 8' Not surprisingly, new federal programs
have become few and far between. Even the regulation of the securities
market, which is widely accepted as a necessary federal function, continues at
the provincial level, despite periodic reports urging federal entry to the field.
The reason, without doubt, is that the federal government does not want to
pick another fight with the provinces.
For these reasons, we believe that Canada's federal system is bound to be
less centralized than those of the United States and Australia. It follows that,
although the Privy Council did favour the provinces, in the end, and perhaps
more by accident than design, Canada was, on the whole, not badly served by
the Privy Council.
V. HAS THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA EXPANDED THE SCOPE
OF CERTAIN FEDERAL POWERS AND DEPARTED FROM THE
MAIN LINES OF INTERPRETATION LAID DOWN BY THE PRIVY
COUNCIL, AND IF SO, HAS CANADA BEEN SERVED WELL OR
SERVED POORLY BY THOSE EXPANSIONS OR DEPARTURES?
In 1949, appeals from Canada to the Privy Council came to an end, and the
Supreme Court of Canada became the final court of appeal for the nation.
Since assuming this responsibility, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of the principal federal heads of power. In a series of decisions, the Court
breathed new life into the national concern branch of the p.o.g.g. power by
8218upholding federal jurisdiction over aviation, the national capital region," and
marine pollution.84 In contrast, the Privy Council, while occasionally
suggesting in dicta that matters of "national concern" might sustain federal
legislation under the p.o.g.g. power,85 had never explicitly upheld federal
legislation on that basis. The Privy Council had restricted the p.o.g.g. power to
79 Re Goods and Services Tax, [ 1992] 2 S.C.R. 445, 94 D.L.R. (4th) 51.
80 R.S.C. 1999, c. 33; R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 32
[Hydro-Quebec cited to S.C.R.].
81 R.S.C. 1995, c. 39; Re Firearms Act, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 185 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2000
SCC 31 [cited to S.C.R.].
82 Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 609.
83 Munro, supra note 27.
84 R. v. Crown Zellerbach, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
85 A "national concern" definition of the p.o.g.g. power was first enunciated by Lord
Watson in the Local Prohibition case, supra note 29, and later picked up by Viscount Simon in
the Canada Temperance case (supra note 37).
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federal legislation that filled gaps in the distribution of powers and that
responded to emergencies. Gaps and emergencies were, however, very few
and far between for their lordships, who did not regard the lack of a Canadian
86 81treaty power as a gap,86 or the Great Depression of 1929 as an emergency.
The Supreme Court has not yet had an occasion to revisit the existence of a
federal treaty power. However, in the Anti-Inflation Reference,88 the Supreme
Court expanded the scope of the emergency branch of the p.o.g.g. power, by
accepting the (rather implausible) proposition that double-digit inflation was
an emergency. On this basis, the Court upheld temporary wage and price
controls enacted by Parliament.89 In contrast, as we noted above, the Privy
Council had struck down Parliament's "Canadian New Deal" legislation on the
basis that the Great Depression was not an emergency.
In General Motors v. City National Leasing,90 the Supreme Court breathed
new life into the general branch of the federal trade and commerce power
(section 91(2)) by upholding federal jurisdiction over competition (anti-trust)
law. The Privy Council had consistently91 rejected the general branch of the
federal trade and commerce power as a support for federal policies of
economic regulation, including the federal regulation of combines, prices and
profits.92
The Supreme Court has also expanded the federal power over criminal law,
upholding a Criminal Code provision that authorized an award of
compensation to victims of crime (basically a civil remedy), 93 and a
prohibition on tobacco advertising (while the harmful product itself remained
lawful), 94 as well as upholding complicated administrative schemes to regulate
86 See supra note 43.
87 See supra note 47.
88 Re Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 [Anti-Inflation
Reference].
89 In addition, the Supreme Court was the first to apply the emergency branch of the
p.o.g.g. power to a situation not associated with war.
90 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255.
91 The one exception is the Canada Standard Trade Mark Reference supra note 47, in
which the Privy Council upheld federal legislation which established a national mark called
"Canada Standard" on the basis that it was a valid exercise of the general branch of the federal
trade and commerce power.
92 Re Board of Commerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513 (P.C.) [Board of
Commerce].
93 R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, 86 D.L.R. (3d) 179.
94 RJR-MacDonald v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1. The Tobacco
Products Control Act, R.S.C. 1988, c. 20 [Tobacco Act], was actually struck down for breach of
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toxic substances 95 and firearm ownership and use.96 In contrast, the Privy
Council had consistently rejected the use of the criminal law power as a
support for laws that did not fit the normal criminal format of a simple (self-
applied) prohibition coupled with a penalty.97
The Supreme Court has decided that it is not bound by decisions of the
Privy Council, and it has explicitly refused to follow a Privy Council precedent
in three constitutional cases.98 The Court has also abandoned the Privy
Council's practice of refusing to consider extrinsic interpretive aids (including
legislative history) for the purpose of interpreting statutes, classifying statutes
for constitutional purposes, and interpreting the Constitution of Canada. The
Court now routinely refers to extrinsic interpretive aids, including the
legislative history of the Constitution Act, 1867.99 For example, the Court has
referred to the Quebec resolutionsl °° and the confederation debates,1°' and, in
one case, it referred to a speech in the United Kingdom Parliament.1
0 2
the guarantee of freedom of expression in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11), but
the majority of the Court held that the Tobacco Act came within the federal criminal-law power.
95 Hydro-Quebec, supra note 80.
96 Re Firearms Act, supra note 81.
97 The Board of Commerce case, supra note 92; Re Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act, [1936] S.C.R. 379, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 607; A.G. Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers,
[1924] A.C. 328, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 789.
98 The first case is Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 at 1234,
1291, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 257 [Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act cited to S.C.R.]. This is a
strong example since (as Laskin C.J. acknowledged at 1256) the Privy Council case, Lower
Mainland Dairy Products v. Crystal Dairy, [1933] A.C. 168, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 82 (P.C.), had
been followed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957]
S.C.R. 198, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257, and the marketing levies successfully challenged in Re
Agricultural Products Marketing Act had been enacted by the federal Parliament in reliance on
those two decisions. Neither judicial re-affirmation nor legislative reliance sufficed to save the
Privy Council decision. The second case is Re Bill 30 (Ont. Separate School Funding), [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1148 at 1190-1196, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 18 [Re Bill 30 cited to S.C.R.] overruling Tiny
Roman Catholic Separate School Trustees v. The King, [1928] A.C. 363, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 753
(P.C.). The third case is Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 at para. 47, 177 D.L.R.
(4th) 73 [Wells cited to S.C.R.], overruling Reilly v. The King, [1934] A.C. 176, 1 D.L.R. 434
(P.C.).
99 Supra note 2.
10o The most recent example is MacDonald v. City of Montreal, [ 1986] 1 S.C.R. 460 at 494,
27 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
101 The most recent example is A.G. Can. v. CN Transportation, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 at
226, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 16.
102 Di Iorio v. Warden of Montreal Jail, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152 at 200, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 491.
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The decisions of the Supreme Court in federalism cases led Lysyk10 3 to
express a "concern" (he phrased it delicately) that the Court was unduly
centralist in its orientation, tending to decide in favour of the federal
government in important cases." However, perhaps the better view is that the
Court was really only supplying a corrective to the unduly narrow rulings of
the Privy Council-rulings that could not have stood the test of time even if
appeals had never been abolished. Certainly, we believe it to be obvious that
the federal Parliament should play a significant role in aviation, the national
capital region, the environment, and competition law, to list some of the
leading decisions. (Perhaps one might argue more about tobacco advertising
and gun control.) While these decisions did expand the federal heads of
legislative power, they are far from revolutionary. Indeed, we take seriously
the claim of the Supreme Court that it is concerned to preserve the balance of
legislative powers. In fact, the main lines of authority established by the Privy
Council, and especially the wide scope of provincial power over property and
civil rights, have not been disturbed by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the two most important federalism cases since 1949 are the
Patriation Reference'°5 and the Secession Reference.10 6 In those cases, the
Supreme Court actually granted new powers to the provinces. In the Patriation
Reference, the Supreme Court held that there was a requirement of convention
that a 'substantial degree' of provincial consent be obtained before a
constitutional change was taken to the United Kingdom for enactment into
law. In effect, this decision invented a new constitutional convention to
regulate the amendment of the constitution in order to give a role to the
provinces that was (before the Constitution Act, 1982107) denied them by law.
This surprising decision involved the Court accepting an argument advanced
by only one of the parties to the Reference, namely, the Attorney General of
103 Lysyk, "Reshaping Canadian Federalism", supra note 4 at 15-2 1.
104 See the studies of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada since 1949 by Paul
Weiler, "The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism", (1973) 23 U. Toronto L.J. 307; Peter
W. Hogg, "Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases?" (1979) 57 Can.
Bar Rev. 721; Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution:The Charter, Federalism, and the
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987); Katherine E. Swinton, The Supreme Court
and Canadian Federalism: The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990); and A. Wayne
MacKay, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: Does/Should Anyone Care
Anymore?" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241.
105 Reference Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, (sub nom.
Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 and 3)) 125 D.L.R. (3d) I
[Patriation Reference].
106 Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Secession
Reference].
107 Supra note 2.
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Saskatchewan. Who was the brilliant counsel for the Attorney General of
Saskatchewan who single-handedly persuaded the Court? Why none other than
Ken Lysyk!
Lysyk played no part in the Secession Reference;08 he was a judge by then.
But in that case, the Supreme Court held that, if a province voted to secede
from Canada, the rest of Canada would come under a legal obligation to
negotiate the terms of secession with that province. In effect, this decision
invented a new constitutional duty to negotiate with a province that had voted
to secede. The point, no doubt, was to soften the ruling that Quebec had no
right to secede unilaterally.
For these reasons, we believe that, although the Supreme Court has
expanded the main federal powers, this development was inevitable as a
corrective to unsustainable Privy Council restrictions. The decisions of the
Court have given needed powers to the federal Parliament, but they have not
markedly altered the balance of power between Parliament and the
Legislatures. The Court perceives the importance of this balance in its
federalism decisions, and the main lines of Privy Council interpretation remain
intact. We do not accept the argument that the federal government can count
on winning important federalism cases, let alone the argument that the country
is becoming too centralized as the result of the decisions of the Supreme
Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1867, the debate about Canadian federalism has been dominated,
explicitly or implicitly, by disagreements over four questions:
Did the framers of the Constitution Act, 1867'09 intend, for Canada, a highly
centralized federal system or a loose confederacy of largely independent
provinces? Our answer is that the English-Canadian framers from Upper
Canada (Canada West) intended the new Canada to be highly centralized, and
the French-Canadian framers from Lower Canada (Canada East), as well as the
representatives from the Maritimes, intended Canada to be a loose confederacy
of largely independent provinces.
As drafted, does the Constitution Act, 1867 indicate that it was intended to
form the foundation for a highly centralized or highly decentralized federal
system? Our answer is that the Act includes a number of features that indicate
an intention to create a highly centralized federal system and a number of
features that indicate an intention to create a decentralized federal system.
Whether it was unconscious or deliberate, the framers included conflicting and
confusing signals in the Act in order to accommodate their differing goals.
108 Supra note 106.
109 Supra note 2.
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Was the Privy Council biased in favour of the provinces in Canadian
federalism cases, and, if so, has Canada been served well or served poorly by
that provincial bias? Our answer is that the Privy Council was biased in favour
of the provinces in federalism cases. We agree that the Privy Council went too
far in restricting the powers of the central Parliament, but, on the whole, we
say that the Privy Council's decisions served Canada reasonably well, because
(notwithstanding the 1867 intentions of the Upper Canadians) a less
centralized model is probably the right model for Canada.
Has the Supreme Court expanded the scope of certain federal powers and
departed from the main lines of interpretation laid down by the Privy Council,
and if so, has Canada been served well or served poorly by those expansions or
departures? Our answer is that the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
the federal heads of power, and has also departed in other respects from the
lines of authority laid down by the Privy Council. But these developments
have not been dramatic, and can be seen as a reasonable corrective to the
excesses of the Privy Council. The general balance of power between the
centre and the provinces has not shifted markedly, and, where it has shifted,
we say that Canada has generally been served well by the Supreme Court's
decisions.
In sum, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1867'10 deliberately drafted a
document that included ambiguities and uncertainties that would need to be
resolved later. The courts-the Privy Council (from 1867 to 1949) and the
Supreme Court of Canada (from 1950 to present)--were left the unenviable
task of resolving these ambiguities and uncertainties. In effect, much of the
Constitution of Canada had to be designed by these final courts of appeal. This
was no small task for a country with a huge land-mass, two official languages,
two judicial systems, three founding peoples (English-Canadians, French-
Canadians, and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada) and a multi-cultural
citizenry. The large body of federalism case law leaves some things for every
critic to complain about, but we say that, on the whole, Canada has not been
badly served by either the Privy Council or the Supreme Court.
110 Supra note 2.
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